Abstract: Uncertainties about technologies and investment opportunities are prevalent for investments in entrepreneurial companies by venture capitalists (VCs), and this study finds that the resolution of these uncertainties, through VCs' learning, is important for their investment decisions. The hypothesis that individual investments are evaluated in isolation, as predicted by standard models, is clearly rejected. The empirical analysis is based on a dynamic learning model derived from the Multi-armed Bandit model. The results suggest that VCs learn from past investments (exploitation) but also consider the option value of future learning (exploration) when making investment decisions.
1
Given their importance for financing high-tech entrepreneurial companies, venture capitalists (VCs) have substantial impact on innovation and development of new technologies (Kortum and Lerner (2000) ). While a great deal has been written about the relationship between VCs and their portfolio companies, 1 less is known about VCs' decisions to invest in particular industries and companies. 2 These investments are fraught with uncertainty (Quindlen (2000) ), and to understand VCs' investment decisions, it is important to understand how these uncertainties are resolved, i.e. how VCs learn. This study finds that VCs' investment decisions are affected both by the expected return from the investments themselves but also by the potential to learn from them. Learning is valuable, since it increases the investors' understanding of various investment opportunities and improves their future decisions. The hypothesis that VCs' investments are chosen independently to maximize the return from each investment individually, as predicted by standard models, is clearly rejected.
The empirical evidence is found using an empirical model derived from the Multiarmed Bandit model (see Berry and Fristedt (1985) and Gittins (1989) ). The central ingredient in this model is the investors' beliefs about the profitability of their investment opportunities and the dynamics of these beliefs. Beliefs are shaped by their past investments and their outcomes, and they affect investment decisions in two ways. First, 1 See, for example, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) , Sahlman (1990) , Lerner (1995) , Gompers and Lerner (1999) , Hellmann and Puri (2000) , Hellmann and Puri (2002) , Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) , and Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2006) . 2 Notable exceptions are Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) and Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) .
not surprisingly, investors prefer investments with greater expected immediate returns.
The immediate return is the direct return from the investment itself. This is the return that is usually captured by economic models, and without learning, it is the only return.
With learning, an additional indirect effect arises since investors prefer investments with more informative outcomes, because these investments help them learn and improve their future decisions. This value can be viewed as an option value of learning, and it generates a trade-off between exploiting investments with known payoffs and exploring investments with uncertain payoffs. 3 This study provides an empirical methodology for separating and measuring exploration and exploitation. To my knowledge, this is the first time these two effects have been estimated separately, 4 and the results confirm that both of them are important determinants of VCs' investment decisions.
Additional predictions from the model are that more valuable investments are made faster, and that VCs that explore more are more successful. These predictions are confirmed empirically, lending further support to the model. Methodologically, the study shows that the statistical index result can simplify the empirical analysis by formulating the sequential decision problem in terms of an econometric discrete choice model. 3 The terminology of exploitation and exploration is introduced by March (1991) in the context of organizational learning. 4 Previous applications of the bandit model include Rothschild (1974) 's model of firms' experimentation with prices to learn about uncertain demand and Weitzman (1979) 's analysis of optimal sequencing of research projects. Manso (2006) study incentive provision in a learning model similar to the Bandit model, and Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Bergemann and Hege (2005) present theories of staged financing based on the bandit model in the context of VC investments. Empirically, Jovanovic (1979) and Miller (1984) estimate models of job turnover in which workers learn about job-specific skills.
Previous studies of learning 5 use computationally intensive estimation procedures to capture the inherent dynamic programming problem (i.e. Crawford and Shum (2005) and Erdem and Keane (1996) ). The index result leads to more transparent and tractable inference, allowing the model to be estimated using standard statistical procedures.
Taking the Bandit model to the data requires additional assumptions. As a starting point, the model assumes that investors chose between investments at the industry level, and that learning takes place at this level as well. This is a natural starting point. It is motivated both by data limitations and by other assumptions inherent in the Bandit model, and Goldfarb, Kirsch and Miller (2007) find evidence of VC behavior consistent with learning at the industry level. The data limitations arise since inference about learning behavior is derived from the VCs' investment histories. The model links their past investments and outcomes to their subsequent investment decisions, and identification is based on comparing investments in industries with shorter and longer histories, corresponding to greater and smaller potentials for learning. Defining categories at finer levels results in more individual categories and shorter histories in each of these, reducing the power of the empirical estimation procedure.
The model assumes that the environment is stationary, that investors only learn from their own past investments, and that investments in one industry are uninformative 5 Another strand of the learning literature considers learning-by-doing, where learning is a free byproduct of an activity (Arrow (1962) ). Recent finance applications include Pastor, Taylor and Veronesi (2006) , Linnainmaa (2006), and Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) , who study learning by the limited partners in VC funds.
about investments in other industries. These assumptions are technical assumptions required for the index result, and they are more reasonable at the industry level than at finer levels. Their severity can be mitigated somewhat by including market-level controls in the empirical analysis to control for general market trends and the effect of other investors' decisions. A more formal relaxation of these assumptions requires explicitly solving the investors' dynamic programming problems as part of the estimation procedure, making the inference problem largely intractable. With these assumptions, the index result overcomes this.
After investing in a company, the outcome of each investment is either a success (subsequent IPO or acquisition of the company) or a failure (liquidation). While this is a coarse outcome measure, it is difficult to obtain more detailed information about the financial performance of these investments, and this classification is standard in the literature. Binary outcomes also simplify they updating of investors' beliefs, since the resulting beliefs are easily captured by the Beta distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section presents the theoretical learning model and the index result. The second section presents the data and variables, and discusses the econometric implementation of the model. Section three presents the empirical evidence of learning. Section four discusses the construction and interpretation of the investors' prior beliefs, and the final section concludes.
I. The Multi-Armed Bandit Model
In the Multi-armed Bandit model 6 an investor faces an infinite sequence of periods, t = 0, 1, … . Each period the investor chooses between K arms, denoted i = 1, 2, … , K, where each arm represents an investment in an entrepreneurial company in industry i. . The investor's problem is to determine the strategy that maximizes total expected return. Let ! denoted the discount factor, and the investor
Formulated as a dynamic programming problem, the Bellman equation is
where the state variables contain the investor's updated beliefs. These develop according to the transition rules 
Equation (3) states that the beliefs are unchanged unless an investment is made in an industry, and equation (4) 
A. Gittins Index
The Bandit problem is a difficult dynamic programming problem, due to the high dimensionality of the state space. With six industries and beliefs captured by two variables, the resulting state space is twelve dimensional, creating a numerically challenging dynamic programming problem, in particular when this problem must be solved repeatedly as part of an estimation procedure. A breakthrough was made when Gittins and Jones (1974) derived the solution to this problem in terms of the Gittins Index. This index is calculated separately for each industry, and the index result shows that the optimal strategy is to choose the industry with the highest value of the index. Let v i (t) be the index for industry i, at time t, and the optimal strategy is 1,..., ( ) arg max ( )
The Gittins index is central for the analysis below. While there is no (known) closed form solution for the index, it can be calculated numerically by solving a reduced dynamic programming problem for each industry separately (see Gittins (1989) ). To understand the properties of the index, it is helpful to review an approximation, derived
by Gittins and Jones (1979) , on the form
where Option Value is a non-negative tabulated function. The net present value of an investment is given by the index, and this value is now decomposed into two terms. The first term, i ! , is the expected immediate return. This is the value of the investment without any learning, and clearly the total value is at least this large. The second term is the value of the investment in excess of the immediate return, and this represents the value of information or the option value of learning. This value is illustrated in Figure 1 for three levels of n i . For given i ! , the option value tends to zero as n i increases. 
II. Empirical Implementation

A. Description of Sample of VC Investments
The data are provided by Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE) and contain the majority of VC investments in the U. (2002) investigate the completeness of Venture Xpert and find that it contains most investments and that missing investments tend to be less significant ones.
The sample is restricted to investments made before 2000, since it typically takes companies three to five years after the initial investment to go public or be acquired, and information about these outcomes is current as of 2005. It is common for multiple VCs to invest in the same company, and the sample contains these multiple investments. VCs also typically stage their investments, but the sample is restricted to each VC's initial investment in a company, to focus the analysis on learning from individual companies and the effect on subsequent investments in other companies. While it would be interesting to study learning from individual rounds, the absence of round level outcome measures prevents this. Further, VCs that make less than 40 investments in the full sample are excluded, since their short investment histories make it difficult to draw inference about their learning process and this create convergence problems for the estimation procedure. This reduces the sample from 3,364 to 216 VCs and eliminates around 50% of the companies. Not surprisingly, eliminated VCs are smaller and more idiosyncratic with lower success rates than the remaining ones. The average success rate for the investors in the final sample is 50% (see Table I below). The rate for eliminated investors is only 39%. Overall, the final sample contains 19,166 investments in 6,076
companies by 216 VC firms.
B. Company Characteristics
Each company is classified as belonging to one of six industries: "Health / Biotechnology," "Communications / Media," "Computer Hardware / Electronics," "Software," "Consumer / Retail," and "Other." 8 The distribution of investments across industries is presented in Table I Table I , panel B, the average success rate is 50.3%, ranging from 13.3 to 86.4% across the VCs in the sample.
Finally, the companies are classified as either early-stage or late-stage when they are funded. Late-stage roughly corresponds to the company having regular revenues, and the binary variable Stage equals one for these companies; 28.7% of the investments are in such companies.
C. Market Conditions
In addition to learning from their own investments, investors may be affected by public market signals and general market conditions. Two variables are used to control for these effects. The option value is calculated by subtracting the expected return from the Gittins index. This index is calculated using a numerical algorithm from Gittins (1989) with a discount factor of 0.99 ! = . 9 With an average time between investments of 48 days, this factor corresponds to an annual discount rate of 8% (the results are robust across a wide range of discount factors). As reported in Table I , Option Value is found to equal 6.2% on average, ranging from 1.9 to 8.2%. As a fraction of total value, option value varies from 3.1 to 53.1% with an average of 25.2%.
One concern is that the updating of the investors' beliefs assumes that the investors immediately learn whether an investment will be successful or not. Clearly, this is a stark assumption. However, the opposite assumption, that investors must wait until the company has an exit event before learning anything, is equally stark. In reality, investors learn gradually during their involvement with a company, but this gradual resolution of the uncertainty is not the focus of the model, and the empirical implementation requires the specification of a point where there learning takes place.
Arguably, this is somewhat arbitrary, but a natural point of learning is the point of the initial investment, since this point is well defined for all investments, regardless of their duration or outcome. To the extent that learning takes place later, this introduces an element of measurement error in the investors' beliefs. To investigate this concern, the model is estimated (unreported) where the updating is delayed from 30 to 360 days after the time of the initial investment. Consistent with hypothesis that the beliefs with delayed updating contain less measurement error, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are weakly increasing in the delay before the beliefs are updated. However, all estimated coefficients are statistically significant and qualitatively similar.
E. Econometric Specification
VCs' investment decision across industries is specified as a multinomial discrete choice model. At the time of each investment, the value of an investment in industry i is
The VC invests in the industry with the highest value, and the probability that of
the model is equivalent to a Multinomial Logit model (see McFadden (1973) and McFadden (1974) ), and it is well known that
The scale of the coefficients is not identified, and it is normalized by fixing the variance of the error term to equal one. Note that a general "investor quality" is not identified
either. An investor fixed effect entering additively across industries cancels out of the maximum operator. This means that the model cannot measure an investor fixed effect, but the estimates are consistent with the presence of such an effect, even if its changes over time (i.e. if investors learn about or improve their "general quality" in addition to their industry specific p i ).
A high value of 1 ! means that investors are more likely to invest in industries with higher expected immediate returns (higher ! ). In other words, 1 ! captures investors' tendency to exploit, and the Bandit model predicts that this coefficient is positive. A high value of 2 ! indicates that investors place weight on the option value and invest in companies with a greater value of information, corresponding to more explorative behavior. Finally, the model predicts that the optimal trade-off is given
III. Evidence of Learning
Estimates of several specifications of equation (7) are reported in Table II 
A. Investment Strategies and Outcomes
The model further predicts that investors that explore more are more successful.
To investigate this relationship, the model is estimated separately for each investor. For this estimation, it is convenient to specify the value of an investment as
The bracket contains the immediate return plus the option value, i.e. the Gittins index.
The second term is option value in excess of the value in the bracket, and investors with positive ,1 j ! exhibit more explorative investment behavior than predicted by the model. ! corresponds to an investor that follow these trends to a greater extent.
One slightly unusual feature of this specification is that the scale of the equation is normalized by fixing the "coefficient" for the first term (in the bracket) to equal one. This is different from the usual normalization where the standard error of the error term is set to one. When the objective is to compare investment behavior across investors, this normalization has two benefits. 11 The model can now estimate the standard error of the error term in equation (9), providing an estimate of how closely the investors follow the predictions of the model. An investor with a large standard error can be interpreted as making more "opportunistic" or "random" investment decisions. Moreover, the alternative normalization also makes the parameters comparable across investors. Under the traditional normalization, differences in standard errors would be reflected in the scale of the equation, making it difficult to compare coefficients across investors with different tendencies to follow the predictions of this model. . Technically, the model is estimated by first estimating a standard Logit model and then rescaling the coefficients using the value of the first coefficient. The standard error 10 The results are largely similar when general trends are measured using Industry Investments. 11 Note that since this is a normalization of the scale of the equation, it is without loss of generality. In particular, it does not imply that the coefficients on the first two terms equal one, in the sense of the first estimated model from equation (7). In fact, the econometric contents of these two models are exactly the same. In the first model, the error term has a standard error equal to one and the first two terms have coefficients of around four to six (from Table II ). With the alternative normalization, the first model would have had coefficients equal to one, but the standard error would only be around 1/6 to 1/4. of the first coefficient provides a measure of how precisely the characteristics of the investor's strategy are estimated, and for investors with shorter investment histories the coefficients are less precise. To adjust, investors are weighted according to the precision of the estimates of their characteristics, with less weight placed on investors with less precise coefficients. One disadvantage of this method is that a small number of investors have negative estimates of the first coefficient of the model, due to random sampling.
These are typically investors with short investment histories and imprecisely estimated characteristics. However, these investors appear to have negative values of j ! , which is difficult to interpret. Since these investors have low weights, all the results are robust to excluding them as well as replacing j ! with its absolute value. To have interpretable magnitudes of the coefficients, these measures are standardized to have standard deviations equal to one in the sample. Panel B in Table I presents both the scaled and raw estimates.
Treating each investor as an individual observation, and using Success Rate as the performance measure, estimates of the following regression are reported in Table IV . to have higher success rates, consistent with the model. An investor that explores more discovers more successful investments and realizes a higher success rate. The greater propensity to explore may be a result of more dispersed prior beliefs or a higher discount factor (a ! closer to one), leading to a higher value of learning. Alternatively, the explorative behavior may be a result of suboptimal investment decisions, but even in this case "excess" exploration should lead to a higher success rate. The coefficient on
Standard Deviation shows that investors with a higher ! j have consistently lower success rates, suggesting that investors who deviate more from the learning model or make more "random" or "opportunistic" investments are less successful. The magnitudes of the effects of Option Value and Standard Deviation are economically meaningful. A one standard deviation increase in exploration (within the sample of investors) is associated with a 2.14 to 2.62% increase in success rate, and a one standard deviation in the "randomness" is associated with a 1.60 to 2.40% drop in success rate. Compared to an average success rate of 50.3% in the sample, these are meaningful effects. Pr( 1)
Consistent with the evidence from the investors' success rates, the results show that investments by more explorative investors are more successful, and investments by more "random" or "opportunistic" investors are less successful. The economic magnitudes are also similar. A one standard deviation increase in 1, j ! corresponds to an increase in the success probability from 1.48 to 3.35%, and a similar increase in j ! corresponds to a decrease in the success probability of 2.12 to 2.99%. The second specification includes the measure of the investor's tendency to follow the market, but this effect is again small and insignificant. The final specification is a kitchen-sink regression with additional controls and fixed effects. Not surprisingly, investments in companies at the late stage are more likely to be successful (15.14%). Investments by more experienced investors are marginally more likely to be successful and investments in industries with more VC-backed IPOs are marginally less successful, which is again consistent with Kaplan and Schoar (2005) . Overall, the results at the investment level supports the evidence at the investor level, although the sign on 2, j ! reverses in the last specification.
B. Investment Speed
The model has implications for the timing of the investments. There are several possible hypotheses. Investors may initially make slow explorative investments, and if these investments are successful, accelerate to benefit from their informational advantage.
Alternatively, investors may make quick initial explorations, perhaps to capture firstmover advantages, and then continue at a more measured pace. In the model, the speed of investing is captured by the discount factor. A ! closer to one implies less discounting between investments, equivalent to a greater speed. As a starting point, assume that increasing the speed requires costly effort. This may reflect the cost of searching for new investments or investing in lower quality companies and working harder to improve them. The investor's problem is now
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Here e is effort, ( ) C e is an increasing convex cost of faster investing, and ( ) e ! is the discount rate, which tends to one as effort increases. This extended model predicts that when the continuation value increases (the last term in equation (12)), the benefit of speed also increases, regardless of whether the continuation value reflects a greater value of learning or a larger immediate return.
This is confirmed empirically. The coefficients of the following OLS regression are reported in Table V .
Time is the number of days since the investor's previous investment, and a longer time is equivalent to a slower speed. To control for investments that are made simultaneously, the sample is restricted to investments that are made at least fourteen days apart. 13 In this 13 The regression results are similar when all the investments are included, but the hazard model described below has problems estimating the hazard rates for investments that are very close.
sample, the average of Time is 80.8 days with a standard deviation of 126. The variable
Gittins represents the continuation value, given by the investment's Gittins index.
14 In the first specification in Table V Finally, the investment speed can be captured by a hazard model. In Table V , specifications 5 and 6 report estimates of a Cox hazard model and the results are consistent with the results from the previous specifications. Note, for the hazard model, 14 Formally, the continuation value is the Gittins index scaled by a factor, see Whittle (1982) (p. 214) .
Notice that a formal solution to this problem would adjust the continuation value to capture the expected future speed and its cost. This problem is not solved here.
coefficients greater than one reflects an increase in the hazard rate, corresponding to a shorter time between the investments (and corresponding to a negative coefficient in the OLS regressions). Again, more valuable investments are made quicker, and this effect is observed for both investments with higher immediate returns and higher option values of learning.
IV. Specification and Interpretation of Prior Beliefs
The and b 0 correspond to more informed and less dispersed beliefs). With more dispersed beliefs, option value is greater, and equation (7) needs to load less heavily on option value to explain the investment history, reducing the estimate of 2 ! . This gives rise to an inverse relationship between the dispersion of the beliefs and 2 ! , and together with the restriction 1 2 ! ! = , it provides a way to estimate the dispersion of the initial beliefs.
This procedure leads to prior beliefs with an initial value of 0 ! of 5%, which is low relative to the empirical success rate. These pessimistic prior beliefs reflect low expected returns from investments in new and untried industries and consequently less exploration and more persistence in industry choice than under more optimistic beliefs.
Note that the estimated coefficient on Option Value is somewhat sensitive to the choice of prior beliefs, due to its direct relationship to the dispersion of the prior beliefs, as explained above. However, the coefficient on ! is substantially more robust to this Finally, the may be some misspecification of the initial beliefs. The assumption that all investors have identical beliefs across industries is not entirely reasonably, but it is necessary for the empirical implementation. This problem is aggravated by the fact that VCs' histories prior to the sample period are unobserved, leading to the "initial conditions problem" discussed by Erdem and Keane (1996) . To investigate the magnitude of this problem, the sample is divided into VCs' early and late investments, and the model is estimated separately for these two sub-samples. Estimates using VCs' initial 10 investments (the early sample) and all later investments (the late sample) are presented in the last two specifications in Table II . For the estimates using the "late sample," the 10 initial investments are used to "burn-in" the VCs' beliefs, and the beliefs should be more accurate in this sub-sample. As observed in Table II , the estimated coefficients are more reasonable for the late sample, whereas the estimates for the initial ten investments are less reasonable, confirming that it is difficult to specify one set of initial beliefs across all investors and industries, but that this problem is smaller after the beliefs have been updated a few times.
V. Summary and Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that VCs learn from past investments and anticipate to learn from future ones. To empirically test for the presence of learning, the paper Industry Investments is total number of investments in each industry per year across all investors in the data. Industry IPOs is the number of companies in the same industry going public in the year of the investment. Industry Experience is the past number of investments by the investor in the industry and Total Experience is total number of the investor's past investments across all industries. In the third specification, investors initial ten investments are discarded from burn-in. Robust standard errors with clustering at the company level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
